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Religions, Human Rights, and Civil Society:  
Lessons from the Seventeenth Century for the 
Twenty-First Century 
J. Paul Martin∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of religion by civic authorities today is a product 
of their respective histories and cultures. In almost every country in 
the industrialized world, however, there is a strong long-term trend 
from a close association between politics and religion to separation of 
the two. A series of debates in seventeenth century Britain contrib-
uted to this process. 
In ancient times, religion and the state were closely related. In 
ancient Greece, Socrates chose to die rather than accept the gods as 
defined by the state of Athens. Rome required of all its citizens at 
least a formal acknowledgement of its gods. From the fourth century 
onwards, with the enthronement of Constantine as emperor, Christi-
anity was elevated to the status of state religion and enjoyed this po-
sition in virtually all of the political entities of eastern and western 
Europe for nearly seventeen hundred years. 
The close association of Christianity and the state survived major 
fractures within the Christian community, including the split be-
tween East and West, which became definitive in the eleventh cen-
tury,1 as well as the divisions resulting from the Protestant Reforma-
tion in the sixteenth century. In both cases, the new dispositions still 
assured a privileged civic status for the Christian religion, although 
 
 ∗  Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia Univer-
sity. Dr. Martin writes primarily on human rights education and the relationship between reli-
gious and human rights groups. 
 1. The Christian churches in the East and the West developed in different directions 
from the fourth century onwards. This split reflected the restructuring of the Roman Empire 
under Constantine when the capital was moved from Rome to Byzantium, later called Con-
stantinople. The respective perceptions of the problems of the relationship were quite different. 
The Papacy in Rome focused on the absolute primacy of its authority. The year 1054 marks 
the date of the Great Schism when representatives of the Orthodox churches refused to accept 
the primacy of Rome and a dogma concerned with relationships within the Trinity. 
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they introduced diversity in terms of the versions so privileged. Radi-
cal change only came with the United States Constitution, which 
provided for the separation of religion and the state. More radical 
forms of separation were implemented later in Latin America, as a re-
sult of anticlericalism, and in Eastern Europe, under the influence of 
the atheist tenets of Marxist-Leninism. 
Today, responding to the growing acceptance of international 
human rights instruments, the growth of secularist rather than reli-
gious beliefs in the West, worldwide population movements that 
have resulted in religiously diverse societies, and the demise of most 
militantly atheist regimes, many countries are seeking to assure free-
dom of religion and belief in their societies. In practice, this is result-
ing in increasing separation of religion and state, although not neces-
sarily following the United States model. 
The history of these changes provides some fascinating episodes 
in the search for ways to accommodate religious diversity. In his 
1960 report to the United Nations on religious freedom, the Indian 
scholar Arcot Krishnaswami reports that twenty-three centuries ago, 
King Asoka, patron of Buddhism, recommended tolerance to his 
subjects, on the grounds that 
[a]cting thus, we contribute to the progress of our creed by serving 
others. Acting otherwise, we harm our own faith, bringing discredit 
upon the others. He who exalts his own belief, discrediting all oth-
ers, does so surely to obey his religion with the intention of making 
a display of it. But behaving thus, he gives it the hardest blows. 
And for this reason concord is good only in so far as all listen to 
each other’s creeds, and love to listen to them. It is the desire of 
the king, dear to the gods, that all creeds be illumined and they 
profess pure doctrines.2 
More recently, in 1998, through the International Religious 
Freedom Act (the “IRFA”),3 the United States government adopted 
another approach to the promotion of religious freedom. The IRFA 
makes the enforcement of religious freedom through various diplo-
matic and economic measures a major component of the foreign pol-
 
 2. Quoted in Arcot Krishnaswami: Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious 
Rights and Practices, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 
(1960), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 2-3 (Tad Stahnke 
& J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Stahnke & Martin]. 
 3. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401-81(Supp. 2000)) [hereinafter IRFA]. 
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icy of the United States, the world’s most powerful nation. No other 
nation has yet taken such a position. These two approaches, namely 
that of Krishnaswami and the United States Government, are very 
different in time and tone. The first emphasizes the need for the 
community to examine, debate, and accept common rules,4 and the 
full title of the Act reads “An Act to establish an Office of Religious 
Persecution Monitoring, to provide for the imposition of sanctions 
against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution and 
for other purposes.”5 
II. THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATES OF SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
ENGLAND 
Modern approaches in the West to religious tolerance and even-
tually separation of church and state grew out of debates that took 
place in seventeenth century England. It was a time when the coun-
try had experienced over one hundred years of tension, if not wars, 
caused by the religious and social alternatives that had sprung from 
the Protestant Reformation. At that time, the ideas of John Calvin 
were especially influential. Like the peoples in other northern Euro-
pean countries, English men and women were responding positively 
to ideas that emphasized the individual’s direct relationship to God 
rather than through the clergy.6 This was not only a religious state-
ment; by asserting that the clergy were less important in religious af-
fairs, these ideas implied a diminished role for religion in civil affairs 
as well. 
The doctrine put in question the past power and prerogatives of 
kings. Unhappy with the performance of some of their kings, a large 
segment of the British population sought a new order of civil gov-
ernment “by the people” on the now accepted premise that civil au-
thorities possessed only as much power as the people gave them.7 
Many of the groups promoting this principle also affirmed that privi-
leges such as the right to vote belonged not only to landholders but 
to all people and especially to those ordinary citizens and soldiers 
 
 4. Stahnke & Martin, supra note 2, at 47. 
 5. IRFA, supra note 3, at § 6401 (emphasis added). 
 6. See Richard Ashcraft, Religion and Lockean Natural Rights, in RELIGIOUS 
DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 195-212 (Irene Bloom et. al. eds., 1998). 
 7. See, e.g., PURITANISM AND LIBERTY: BEING THE ARMY DEBATES 1647-1649, FROM 
THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPTS (A.S.P. Woodhouse ed. 1992) (containing verbatim debates on 
self-government issues) [hereinafter PURITANISM AND LIBERTY]. 
MART-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
936 
who had been fighting for their freedoms against the kings and the 
system that had thus far denied them those rights.8 Interestingly, 
their political arguments were still advanced in religious terms. Many 
participants in the debates consistently sought to justify their political 
opinions based on the tenets of their faith and the words of the Gos-
pel. 9 Others argued this was not possible.10 
We have verbatim records of some of these debates that took 
place in and around London between 1647 and 1649. The 1647 
debates were fascinating because they gathered together in different 
sites around London leaders of the main political factions and com-
moners, rich and poor, famous and unknown, to debate some of the 
options for a new constitutional structure in England. The topics in-
cluded the roles of the army and the king, the rights of property 
holders versus others, and the power of the civil magistrate with re-
gard to a person’s religious beliefs.11 
One of the organizers who was personally vocal in the debates 
was Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), a very successful military officer 
who was then in the process of modernizing and professionalizing 
the British Army. Before he removed the army from politics once 
and for all, however, he used the units he controlled to force King 
Charles II into exile in 1646. In the period that followed, before he 
became Lord Protector of England, he helped organize a series of 
debates, which led to important constitutional changes, but without 
greater provision for religious freedom.12 
The debaters represented the mainstreams within Puritanism, 
which was then the dominant version of the Christian faith in Eng-
land. Within this tradition, based primarily on Calvin’s ideas, there 
were still many theological factions characterized by names such as 
Levellers, Diggers, Ranters, Quakers, and Millenarists. The Putney, 
 
 8. A petition to the House of Commons in 1648 reads: “That you would have made 
both kings, queens, princes, dukes, earls, lords, and all persons, alike liable to every law of the 
land . . . .” Id. at 339. 
 9. “Truly we have heard many speaking to us; and I cannot but think that in many of 
those things God hath spoke to us. . . . [W]e do act as Christians, as men guided by the Spirit 
of God, as men having the wisdom from above . . . .” Id. at 104, 107. 
 10. “[W]e cannot find anything in the word of God of what is fit to be done in civil 
matters.” Id. at 107. 
 11. See id. at 13, 27-29. 
 12. In 1646, Oliver Cromwell, who was the Lieutenant General of the army, enjoyed 
great prestige because of his military success and modernization of the army. He presided over 
these meetings of the General Council of the Army with the Commissary General Ireton. 
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or Army, debates,13 as they were called, lasted for days at a time. Re-
corded verbatim, they were not transcribed until the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
During this period of massive social change in England, all insti-
tutions were questioned with regard to their social function, most 
notably the universities, the cities, rural life, and Sabbath observance. 
At issue was the desire to purify the state by imposing higher moral 
standards on civil or public life in Britain. The problem was agreeing 
on which standards to impose. The conservatives saw the ideal of in-
dividual liberty as the path to moral breakdown, the end of private 
property, houses, and wives: in a word, the “perdition of souls and 
bodies.”14 Their opponents argued the importance of maintaining 
the Puritan commitment to the supremacy of the individual con-
science and to the equality of all men,15 on the grounds that each 
person is ultimately answerable to his or her own conscience and to 
God, no matter what those in authority might say or order. For 
them, obedience to God took precedence over obedience to civil au-
thority,16 but there is an interesting perception that God’s word 
comes through the consensus of the many rather than through the 
opinion of a few.17 Therein lay another dilemma: how does the civil 
power prevent anarchy and ensure social order if civil society cannot 
coerce individual citizens? 
Out of these debates came a solution to this problem: civil power 
could rule in public affairs and the individual conscience in private, 
especially when religious beliefs and worship were at issue. One of 
the specific political outcomes of these debates was a constitutional 
order excluding clergy from politics.18 Clergy were properly in 
 
 13. The Putney debates took place from October 28, 1647, until November 1, 1647. 
Another series took place at Whitehall from December 1648 to January 1649. For a more gen-
eral discussion of the context of these debates, see J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1603-1689 (1983), especially chapter nine: 
“The Long Parliament and the Army,” id. at 134-50. 
 14. PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 5, at 51. 
 15. See id. at 53. 
 16. See id. at 61 (“[N]o injury is done when it is subordinated to the special and truly 
supreme power of God.” (quoting CALVIN, INSTITUTES 4. 20. 32 (Beveridge trans.)). 
 17. “God does not now speak by one particular man, but in every one of our hearts; and 
certainly if it were a dangerous thing to refuse a message that came from one man to many, it is 
a more dangerous thing to refuse what comes from God, being spoke by many to us.” Id. at 
100-01 (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, reprinted in 33 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
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charge within the church and its activities, especially worship. The 
net result of this distinction was the definition of two spheres of in-
fluence, the one religious and the other civil. While this did not re-
sult in what eventually became the Anglican Church being separated 
from the state, the power of the state and its officers to judge a citi-
zen’s religious conviction was circumscribed.19 There were, however, 
limitations, as is visible in the following discussion of John Locke’s 
approach to religious tolerance. 
III. ANALYZING LOCKE’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 
Some thirty to forty years after the Putney or Army Debates, 
John Locke elaborated a more systematic set of arguments in favor of 
a separation of religious beliefs from the political process in his trea-
tises (notably his Letter Concerning Toleration). While personally a 
very religious person, Locke sought to separate religion and politics 
to prevent an alliance between the civil and religious authorities. In 
his view, religious freedom and a peaceable civil society required the 
separation of the two authorities. Tolerance, however, had its limita-
tions, as the late Richard Ashcraft pointed out in one of his studies of 
Locke: 
Catholics according to Locke (and most of his contemporaries) 
owed their primary allegiance to a foreign power, the pope. They 
subscribed to beliefs that were destructive of all human society: that 
faith was not to be kept with heretics (Protestants), that kings 
could be deposed for religious reasons, that dominion was founded 
in grace and other propositions which made Catholics “irreconcil-
able” enemies to any Protestant government . . . . Whereas the 
sphere of religious belief was, in general, governed by persuasion, 
reason and the individual’s own conscience, Locke . . . endorsed 
the application of force to Catholics as a means by which they 
might be “converted” to the truth of Protestantism.20 
This led Ashcraft to note that 
[t]he political argument for religious toleration while it obviously 
made use of appeals to individual reason, natural law etc., de-
pended for its practical success upon appeals to prejudices, fears and 
 
 19. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (Eng. 1689). 
 20. Ashcraft, supra note 4, at 207. 
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hatreds shared by the community and directed against Catholics, 
and to a lesser extent, atheists who were also excluded from mem-
bership in political society as defined by Locke’s Letter [Concern-
ing Toleration].21 
While it is easy enough to recognize the historical limitations of 
Locke’s particular definition of religious freedom, Ashcraft uses it to 
identify a more radical argument, namely, that all such definitions, 
including that of “rights” itself, are subject to the vagaries of time: 
To see such rights as products of the cultural prejudices of the 
community, or a fragile political alliance, or a fear of a common en-
emy etc, may place these rights within a less attractive framework, 
but at the same time, it reinforces our consciousness that such 
rights are impermanent, that they are products of political struggle, 
and that organized human action is necessary to guarantee their 
preservation. Indeed the very recognition that such rights and the 
political values of Lockean liberalism generally depended upon 
shared religious beliefs which are no longer constitutive of our po-
litical society ought to make us more, not less concerned with the 
problematic character of the contemporary rights claims advanced 
by the individual and against the state.22 
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Moving now to the end of the twentieth century, we are con-
fronted by a very different stage. Religious freedom is now a subject 
of international debate and foreign, rather than solely domestic, pol-
icy. Religious pluralism is no longer a question of accepting differ-
ences within Puritanism or even within Christianity, but of the coex-
istence of all the world’s different religions and beliefs. There is an 
international bill of human rights that defines in basic terms the na-
ture of rights, including freedom of religion and belief, and the obli-
gation of the world’s states to enforce them domestically and inter-
nationally.23 In the words of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (the “UDHR”), today “[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 208. 
 23. The International Bill of Rights is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1976). 
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change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in com-
munity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”24 
With the enactment of the IRFA, the United States has radically 
changed the enforcement scale. Religious freedom is now not only a 
part of United States foreign policy, it has been incorporated to such 
an extent that certain actions that publicize the issue are regularly re-
quired of the Department of State. 
Each year, for example, the Department must issue a report on 
the state of religious freedom around the world.25 The second such 
report was published in February 2000.26 Inevitably, any country 
portrayed in a pejorative light feels obliged to defend itself in an 
equally public way. This is aggravated by the fact that the report also 
groups countries into categories from the worst to least offensive. 
Thus, the worst category includes countries like Afghanistan, China, 
Cuba, and Iraq that “control” religious beliefs and practices.27 Lesser 
violators are grouped in other categories: those such as Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Serbia that are merely “hostile” to some religions, 
“neglect discrimination” against religions, or still “retain legislation 
that discriminates,” as opposed to those that merely “stigmatize” 
some religious groups, like France, Belgium, and Germany.28 The 
IRFA also established an ambassador whose task it is to monitor and 
promote religious freedom around the world.29 As an ambassador, he 
now travels the world to represent United States policy to govern-
ments that are seen to restrict religious freedom. The Act has thus 
made religious freedom and the practices of other countries a major 
component of the diplomacy of the world’s most powerful state. 
In spite of the change in scale, there are still many similarities be-
tween the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. The question is still 
how the civil power should treat the different religious convictions 
 
 24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 
art. 18 (1948). The wording differs in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief, in that the right to change one’s religion is omitted. 
 25. See 22 U.S.C. § 6412(b)(1) (Supp. 2000). 
 26. U.S. STATE DEP’T ANN. REP. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999 (submitted 
to the Committee of International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Department of State, February 2000). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See 22 U.S.C. § 6411 (Supp. 2000). 
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and practices of its citizens. In virtually all countries, some religions 
are treated differently from others in terms of taxation, property 
rights, access to public education, or one’s place in the national iden-
tity. The problem remains that the diversity of religion and belief re-
sults in differences in the way these issues are treated by most states. 
In addition, religion is still an integral, if not exclusive, factor in civil 
wars and lesser social tensions. Certain religions are also highly 
committed to seeking converts, often at the expense of other relig-
ions. 
V. SOME LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
The first lesson of history is that we must always be prepared for 
continuing adjustments and to recognize the imperfections and tran-
sitory nature of any given normative synthesis. Locke and the Puri-
tans worked out an ethic for themselves. It took two hundred more 
years, however, for the political system in Britain to recognize the 
rights of Catholics. In spite of high ideals, Locke and his contempo-
raries were willing to use state power for their religious cause, namely 
to coerce Catholics to convert to Protestantism. Civil power can be 
misused, and it often takes historical distance to recognize it. 
Today, the United States, the world’s most powerful nation, has 
undertaken a very active role in promoting religious freedom, forcing 
other countries to be reactive. Claiming to rely on the current inter-
national definition of religious freedom, the United States is ready to 
take resolute unilateral action.30 Importantly, however, the United 
States Congress passed the IRFA with little or no public debate on 
the floor. Was that because no elected representative in Washington 
wanted to appear opposed to religious freedom? The bill was not ex-
amined in detail in public debate. In contrast to the British process 
that relied on weeklong debates among substantial segments of the 
population, the United States process took place behind close doors, 
with little national or, given the modern world, international consul-
tation. 
The second lesson of history is that building consensus is impor-
tant, even if only in the face of common enemies. Both external 
sanctions and internal reforms can bring about religious freedom. 
 
 30. Section 6432 of the IRFA defines the tasks of the Commission on International Re-
ligious Freedom, including making policy recommendations ranging from diplomatic inquiries 
to imposition of broad trade sanctions and withdrawal of the chief of mission. 
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Both can be effective, but, while sanctions can help, internal reforms 
within the individual countries are essential. Governments, notably 
Cuba and Iraq, have used the imposition of sanctions to strengthen 
their own authority within the country by portraying themselves as 
resisting American imperialism.31 Without a stronger international 
consensus in the form of a treaty on freedom of religion and belief, 
even if it appeals to Article 18 of the UDHR, the United States gov-
ernment will be frequently accused of trying to impose its own vision 
of religious freedom on other countries or of using religious freedom 
to pursue its political goals. 
The concept of civil society in seventeenth century England does 
not correspond to the generally accepted concept in the twentieth 
century. As opposed to today’s definition of the complex of forces 
and institutions outside the ambit of the state, the seventeenth cen-
tury model described the realm in which the state could operate 
without the oversight of the clergy. Certainly, it was not a perfect 
separation, but it laid the foundation for states to recognize limita-
tions on their powers with regard to the beliefs and personal morali-
ties of their citizens. In other words, states were compelled to be-
come tolerant for a range of, if not for all, religious convictions. 
Perhaps the main lesson from the English experience for us today 
is the degree to which tolerance is often accompanied and condi-
tioned by prejudice and the exclusion of some groups from the con-
sensus. It is not clear which lessons should be learned from the fact 
that it took two hundred years for Catholics to enjoy religious free-
dom and full civic emancipation. Ashcraft argues that it shows that 
any consensus, including human rights, on the part of a given polity 
is subject to revision.32 This would seem to underline the importance 
of each society having institutions that assure continual revision and 
inclusiveness. It does not indicate whether all those excluded today 
will or ought to be included tomorrow. 
While the seventeenth century experience tells us nothing about 
international diplomacy, reading the verbatim accounts of the often 
 
 31. For a comprehensive discussion of sanctions, see Dianne E. Rennack & Robert D. 
Shuey, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law, 
in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION (CRS ed. 1997), and Robert P. 
Quinn, A User’s Guide to Economic Sanctions, in ROE BACKGROUNDER 1126 (The Heritage 
Foundation ed. 1997). 
 32. See Ashcraft, supra note 4, at 208. 
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vitriolic debates among highly committed and emotional believers,33 
one cannot help but be struck by the possibilities and benefits of ex-
tended verbal exchanges in building consensus among parties. In the 
field of religion and civil society today, one must, therefore, recom-
mend finding analogous space in both the domestic and interna-
tional arenas for debate and consensus building among the multiplic-
ity of parties concerned with religion, rights, and civil society around 
the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33. One speaker noted, “I chanced to speak a word or two. Truly there was more of-
fence taken at it. . . . not only against yourself and the Commissary, but [against] every man 
that would dispute till we have our throats cut . . . .” PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 5, 
at 81. Another said “I am sorry that my zeal to what I apprehend is good should be so ill re-
sented,” followed shortly afterwards by another’s request “that there might be a temperature 
and moderation of spirit within us.” Id. at 74-75. 
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